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Abstract
Hardware redundant fault-tolerant systems and the different design
approaches are discussed. The reliability analysis of fault-tolerant systems is
usually done under permanent fault conditions. With statistical data suggesting
that up to 90% of system failures are caused by intermittent faults, the reliability
analysis of fault-tolerant systems must concentrate more on this class of faults.
In this work, a reconfigurable Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) with spare
system that differentiates between permanent and intermittent faults has been
built. The reconfiguration process of this system depends on both the current
status of its modules and their history. Based on this, a different approach for
reliability analysis under intermittent fault conditions using Markov models is
presented. This approach shows a much higher system reliability compared to
other redundant and non-redundant configurations.
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The widespread use of computers in almost every aspect of life motivates
the need for more reliable computers, especially in such applications where
computer failures may cause great financial or human tragedies. Although
practicing more conservative design approaches and using more reliable
hardware and software components, does increase the reliability of computer
systems, computer failures still happen. These failures are caused by different
factors, from harsher environmental conditions to user abuse. Even in a
favorable environment, computer systems nowadays are much more
sophisticated and contain a larger number of hardware and software
components, which are bound to fail, making the overall probability of a system
failure even larger.
With faults being unavoidable, the trend is to design computers that can
tolerate faults and prevent them from causing errors and system failures. Before
discussing some of the fault-tolerant computing techniques, one should
understand common faults, their types, distribution, causes, and extents.
1.2 Faults: Types, Causes, and Distribution
A fault is a physical defect, or an erroneous state of hardware
or software components, which may cause failure or system error.
When designing a fault-tolerant system it is important to identify the faults
that may occur, their types, causes, effects, extents and distribution. Then
designers should decide what action(s), if any, should be taken in respose to a
fault. This decision depends on many factors such as: system failure cost versus
fault-tolerant design cost, repair cost, application cruciality, fault distribution, etc.
Faults may be permanent, intermittent, or transient. Permanent faults
result in forcing the system, or part of it, into a faulty state. Intermittent and
transient faults occur occasionally caused by unstable hardware or software
conditions.
Causes of Faults
Faults have different causes. Understanding these causes enables the
designers to anticipate and hence, tolerate them. The first cause of faults is
incomplete, vague, or incorrect hardware and/or software specifications. The
second cause of faults is implementation mistakes. These mistakes happen
during the translation of hardware and software specifications into a system. The
third and most crucial cause of faults is hardware defects. The fourth cause of
faults is external factors, such as harsher environmental conditions, temperature
extremes, fluctuating in the supply voltage, interfaces, user abuse or mistakes,
etc.
Faults Distribution
Faults happen at any time of system operation. But different types of
faults are dominant at different stages of the system life. As shown in figure 1.1,
a system life can be divided into three stages. The first stage is the infant
mortality period. During this period systems usually have high failure rate due to
either component defects or manufacturing mistakes. It is a common procedure
to burn in the systems before puting them into operation. The next stage is the
normal life period. This period is characterized by a constant failure rate. The
last stage is the wear-out period, where the failure rate starts increasing again
due to hardware aging. Of course, the boundaries between these stages are not
clear cut and may differ from one system to another. Harsher environmental
conditions, for example, may cause the system to wear-out earlier. It is important
to notice that fault-tolerant systems are usually designed to tolerate faults only













Bathtub curve describing failure rates as a function of time
1.3 Fault Tolerance
Fault-tolerance is the system ability to continue its operation correctly
despite the existence of a fault(s).
Although fault-tolerant systems are usually described as being either
highly reliable or highly available, there are other attributes to fault-tolerant
systems. Such as performance, safety, maintainability, and/or testability.
Fault-
tolerant systems may be designed to achieve some or all of these requirements.
1.3.1 Reliability: R(t)
Reliability is the conditional probability that a system will perform correctly
during the time interval [0, t], given that it was operational at the beginning
of the interval (t = 0).
Reliability is considered to be the most important factor in applications
where system failures are not acceptable, either because of their consequences,
or because systems cannot be repaired, as in satellites. Highly reliable systems
usually contain some redundant hardware, which will enable the system to
continue its operation without interruption upon system failure (as in the case of
hot standby systems).
1.3.2 Availability : A(t)
Availability is the probability that a system is operational correctly at any
time t.
The goal here is to make the system as available to the user as possible.
Availability is typically used as a figure of merit in systems where short duration
failures do not have serious consequences. Because availability can be defined
as operation time divided by total life time, a system can be highly available
while having frequent failures, as long as these failures have short duration and
repair times. The use of spares during the system down and repair times is very
common in highly available systems.
1.3.3 Performability : P(L,t)
Performability is the probability that a system performance is at, or higher
than some level L at time t.
One of the drawbacks of some fault-tolerance techniques is lower system
performance; this is obvious in majority voting systems where some processor
time must be wasted to synchronize the processors. This measure is used to
ensure that the system performance does not fall below a certain level L.
1.3.4 Safety : S(t)
Safety is the probability that a system will not fail into a state that may
disturb the operation of other related systems, or endanger the people
associated with it.
Fault-tolerant systems differ in the way they respond to a fault. Most of
fault-tolerant systems follow more conservative design approaches, pass
through different quality control tests (to avoid faults caused by specification and
implementation mistakes), and are designed to handle harsher environmental
conditions and external disturbances. With this being done, designers are left
with two choices in dealing with faults: either mask them or tolerate them. Fault
Masking is the process of preventing faults from causing errors and system
failures. Majority voting systems are a typical example of such technique;
another example is the use of error detecting and correcting codes. Fault
Tolerance, on the other hand, requires fault detection, location, confinement,
and recovery (usually through reconfiguration). In either case, some form of
redundancy is required.
1.4 Redundancy
Redundancy is the addition of extra hardware, software, information, or
repetition that is not needed for normal system operation.
The addition of redundant resources does not come free and may
degrade the system performance, especially in the case of software and time
redundancy. Therefore, a trade off between the redundant design cost versus
the system failure cost must be made to decide what form and level of
redundancy is needed. In this section we will breifly discuss the different kinds of
redundancy that are commonly used.
Software Redundancy
Software redundancy is the use of extra software beyond the system's
normal operation need. One example is the software added to produce error
correcting and detecting codes.
Information redundancy
Information redundancy can be seen in all error correcting and detecting
codes, where extra information, parity, check sum, m-of-n codes, duplication of
words, etc, are added for the purpose of fault-tolerance. It is also worth
mentioning that information redundancy involves both software and hardware
redundancy.
Time Redundancy
Time Redundancy is useful in systems where speed is less important, or
in applications that do not form a computational challenge to the system and do
not require a short response time. The basic idea of this form of redundancy is
the repetition of computation in a way that will detect faults. For example, faults
with short duration (intermittent and transient) can be detected if the computation
is repeated at different times.
Hardware Redundancy
Hardware redundancy is becoming more popular due to the decreasing
cost, size, and power requirements of hardware components. Hardware
redundancy is used to mask faults and prevent them from generating errors, or
to detect, locate, and recover from faults. The earliest (and maybe the most
common) form of this redundancy is the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).
1.4.1 Triple Modular Redundancy : TMR
Triple modular redundancy is the first form of hardware redundancy
techniques, introduced by J. Von Neuman in 1956. Figure 1.2 shows the basic
configuration of this form. The output in such designs agrees with the majority
(2-out-of-3) of the processors (or modules). This means that the system can
tolerate (mask) single module failures only. The reliability of such designs
cannot be higher than the voter reliability. A voter failure is considered to be a
common point failure. To overcome this problem the voter can be triplicated as
shown in figure 2.3.
Another majority voting technique is the N-Modular Redundancy, NMR,
which is the general case of TMR. In this method N modules (usually are odd















TMR with Triplicate voters
Another common technique is the TMR with spare, as shown in Figure
1.4. It consists of a TMR system, spare, switching circuitry, and some fault
detection and location hardware. The basic modules start the voting process;
then, upon a module failure, the spare will be considered in the voting process. If
these modules are isolated from each other, the failed module can be replaced
or repaired without interrupting the system's operation. Obviously this system is














A TMR System with Spare
1 .5 Problems with majority voting techniques
In addition to common point failure, majoty voting techniques have other
major problems. For example, adding redundant modules does not necessarily
improve the reliability of a system
over its simplex counterpart as one would first
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expect. To illustrate this, consider a TMR system. The system is functioning
correctly if:
all three modules are functioning correctly,
or two of the modules are operational and one is not.
So, if we denote the system's reliability by RSyS , and the module's reliability by
R, then
RSyS =







And the crossover (intersection) point will be
Rsys = R
0 = 3R2 - 2R3 - R
solving yields:
R = 0, 1/2, or 1.
The above result suggests that, using three modules with reliability
of 0,
1/2, or 1 in a TMR system will not improve the
system's reliability over its simplex
counterpart at all. Furthermore, using modules with reliability less
than 0.5 in a
TMR system will worsen the overall system reliability
with respect to its simplex
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Evaluation measures are needed to determine whether a fault-tolerant
system will achieve its goals without actually building it. These measures will
also help designers decide what fault-tolerant techniques are most suitable for
their applications. Section 2.2 introduces some of the evaluation measures
available. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 introduce some of the most common tools
used to analyze fault-tolerant systems. Section 2.6 is a comparison between
different fault-tolerant systems. Finally, section 2.7 discusses the effect of
intermittent faults on fault-tolerant systems.
2.2 EVALUATION MEASURES
Several measures are available for evaluating fault-tolerant systems. These
measures can be divided into two categories: quantitative and qualitative.
Although qualitative measures are, to an extent, subjective in nature,
quantitative measures give numbers that can be used to compare different
systems. Usually a collection of these measures are needed to fully describe a
system. The most common measures are: Failure Rate, Reliability, Availability,
Mission Time, Mean Time To Failure, Mean Time Between Failure, Mean Time
To Repair, Fault Coverage, Safety, and Cost.
2.2.1 Failure Rate Z(t)
Failure rate, or hazard rate, is defined as the total
number of system failures
per time period. During the system normal life time failures have a
constant rate
of occurrence (see figure 1.1, bath-top curve), hence Z(t) = Lambda (L). The
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most common technique used for estimating failure rates is the United States
Department of Defense (USDOD) MIL-HDBK-217 standards, which predicts the
constant failure rate of an Integrated Circuit (IC) to be:
L = FL FQ(C1 Ft + C2 FE) FP failures per million hours.
Where,
FL : Learning Factor, this factor represents the level of confidence in the
fabrication process. Devices fabricated using a new and yet unproved process
are assigned a learning factor of 10, while those produced using a proven
process are assigned a factor of 1 .
FQ Quality Factor, this factor represents the level of the
device screening and
testing. Typical values vary froml to 300.
FT : Temperature Factor, this factor depends
on the device technology,
operating temperature, and power
dissipation. For example, the temperature
factor (FT) for bipolar circuits is given by :





FE Environmental Factor, this
factor represents the harshness of the operating
environment. Typical values vary form 0.2 to
10.0
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Fp Pin Factor, this factor is a function of the number of pins on the IC. Typical
values ranges from 1 .0 to 1 .2.
C^ C2 : Complexity Factors, these factors are functions of the number of gates
in a logic circuit.
Table 2.1 shows some failure rate values computed using MIL-HDBK-217B
standards.







Table 2.1, Failure rates calculated using





= 0.2, FP = 1). Johnson 1989.
2.2.2 Reliability R(t)
Recall that Reliability is the conditional probability that a component (or a
system) will operate correctly
throughout the interval [t0,t] given that it was
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operational at time t^. Consider a system put into operation at time t0 and tested
at time t.
Let, N be the total number of system components.
Nf(t) be the number of failed components at time t.




































Equation (2.1) is known as the exponential failure law.
2.2.3 Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
Mean time to failure Is the expected operation time of a system before its
first failure. MTTF can be measured experimentally. For example, consider N
identical systems put into operation at time t0, and at time tj system i encounters
its first failure, then
MTTF= (t, +t2 + ... +tN)/N
Or, let f(t) be the failure density function, then
MTTF = ]t f{t)dt
o





As an example, Consider a simplex system with
R(t) =
e"Lt
The MTTF for this system is:
MTTF = 1/L (2.2)
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Mean Time To Repair & Mean Time Between Failures (MTTR & MTBF)
Repair rate (MTTR) is defined as the average number of repairs per hour.
Although the expected value of repair rate cannot be found directly as failure
rate, it is a common assumption in systems with small failure rates, that repair
rate = failure rate. Now, if we denote repair rate by m then,
MTTR = 1/m
and
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR
2.2.4 Fault Coverage
Fault coverage is a measure of the system's ability to detect, locate, confine,
and recover from faults. The most important aspect of fault coverage is the fault
recovery coverage, which is sometimes used to denote fault coverage in
general. Mathematically, it is defined as the conditional probability that the
system will recover given that a fault exists, or,
C = P ( fault recovery | fault exists)
Fault coverage is not easy to calculate, because it usually requires
developing a list of all possible faults and then deciding what factor of these
faults can be detected, located, confined, and recovered from. This may require
exhaustive testing of the system with a very large number of test vectors.
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2.2.5 Mission Time MT(r)
Mission time is an estimate for the time at which the system's reliability falls
below some level r. For example, a non-redundant system that follows the
exponential failure law has a reliability
R(t) =
e-Ll
To find MT(r) for this system, set r
= e






A simple example will show the importance of this measure. Consider a
non-
redundant system with failure rate L = 0.002 failures/hour. The mission time for
this system at a reliability level of 0.95 is:
MT(0.95)simp|ex
= [ -In (0.95) ] / 0.002
= 25.64 hours.
Now, consider a TMR system with the
same failure rate. The system's mission
time at the same reliability level as
before is (R(t) is given by equation 1.1):
0.95 =
3e<-0-004t)-2e<--006t)




The previous result states that at a failure rate of 0.002 failure/hour, a TMR
system is expected to operate 5.45 times longer than a single-module simplex
system before its reliability falls bellow 0.95
2.3 RELIABILITY MODELING
Loosely used to denote evaluation criteria for fault tolerant systems,
reliability is one of the most important system attributes. System reliability can be
measured experimentally (as seen earlier). But this requires the availability of a
sufficiently large population of such systems, and one may wait for years for the
expected failures to happen, which is totally impractical. Hence the importance
of reliability analysis. Reliability analysis can be done under various
assumptions, such as failure to exhaustion and failure with repair. Failure to
exhaustion assumes that all system components (modules) fail before any repair
can take place. Systems operating under this assumption can be modeled using
combinatorial modeling techniques. Failure with repair, on the other hand,
involves the modeling of two concurrent processes, the failure process and the
repair process. Markov modeling is one of the most popular techniques for this
kind of system.
2.3.1 Combinatorial Modeling
Combinatorial modeling divides the system into non-overlapping modules.
Each module is assigned a probability of working Pj (or Rj(t)), then some
probabilistic techniques are used to enumerate all possible ways for the system
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operation. System reliability is defined as the sum of the
modules'
reliabilities in
all these different ways. This technique makes the following assumptions :
1 . Module failures are independent.
2. Failed modules yield incorrect results.
3. The system fails when all working modules do not form a way that is
sufficient for system operation.
4. A failed system cannot return to correct operation by any further failures.
These assumptions are suitable for modeling random hardware failures in a
system. But when failures are caused by some global factors, the first
assumption, for example, is not accurate. To analyze systems reliabilities,
combinatorial modeling categorize systems into series and parallel systems, and
a combination of these.
Series Systems
A series system can be seen as a system that has no redundancy at all,
where all system modules are necessary for correct system operation. Consider
the series system shown in figure 2.1. Its reliability is given by:
R(t)series= Ri(t) R2(t) RN-lW RN(t) (2.4)
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Figure 2. 1 A series system of N modules
Parallel Systems
A parallel system of N modules (such as the one in figure 2.2) can be seen as a
system with a redundancy level of (N 1), where one operating module is
sufficient for correct system operation. To analyze such systems, let us define
the unreliability of module i to be, Qj(t)
= 1 - Rj(t).
It is obvious that the system of figure 2.2 will fail if and only if all its N modules
fail, or,













Figure 2.2 A parallel system of N modules
Series/Parallel Systems
Some fault-tolerant systems can be modeled as a combination of series and
parallel systems. Modules with high failure rates or those more critical to the
application are usually configured in parallel. Those with infrequent failures or
those with tolerable failure results are usually configured in series. The reliability
of a system depends (in addition to other factors) on the way its modules are
configured. To illustrate this, consider a redundant system consisting of two
processors, A & B, and two memory modules, C & D, with one processor and
one memory module being needed for system operation. Figure 2.3 shows two
ways of configuring these modules.
- The system in figure 2.3-a requires the combination of either A-C, or B-D for its
correct operation, hence represents two series modules, A-C and B-D,
configured in parallel.
Rfig2.3-a(t) =
1- [( (1-RaW Rc(t)) )(
1" (RbW RdW) )]
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- The system in figure 2.3-b requires the combination of any processor and any
memory modules for its correct operation, and so it represents two parallel
modules configured in series.
Rfig2.3-b(t) = [
1- (1-RA(t))(1-RB(t)) ][ 1- (1-RC(t))(1-RD(t)) 1
B D
Figure 2.3-a Parallel series configuration
A ,
B ' D
Figure 2.3-b Series parallel Configuration
To simplify the comparison,
assume that
RA(t) = RbW
= Rc(t) = RD(t) = R
then,
24





= 4R2 - 4R3 + R4
It is obvious that the reliability of the system in figure 2.3-b (Rfjg2.3-b) is larger
than that of figure 2.3-a (Rfig2.3-a)- Tnis resu,t shows that the reliability of a fault
tolerant system is depends on its configuration.
Modeling a TMR System
A TMR system can be modeled using combinatorial modeling techniques by
enumerating all possible ways for system operation. Consider a TMR system
with three modules A, B, and C configured in a majority voting fashion. The
system requires any two of these to be operational for its correct operation.
Assuming that the voter has a reliability of 1.0, the TMR reliability is given by :
RtmrW = raW RB(t) Rc(t) + RA(t)RB(t)(i-Rc(t))
+ RA(t)Rc(t)(i-RB(t)) + RB(t)Rc(t)(i-RA(t))
Now, if RA(t) = RB(t)





The above result agrees with the formula derived earlier (equation 1.1). We can
follow the same analysis to find the reliability of any N-out-of-M system, where N
operational modules are required for correct system operation.
In addition to the assumption that module failures are independent, which is
inaccurate in some cases, combinatorial modeling has other problems. One of
the major problems is the perfect fault coverage assumption, which means that
the detection of a failed module in the system has a probability of 1.0. Another
problem is the assumption that the reconfiguration process is also a perfect one
and happens in zero time units. Furthermore, the modeling of complex systems
can be extremely difficult. Finally, combinatorial modeling techniques cannot
model systems with repair and sometimes require very restrictive assumptions.
2.3.2 Markov Modeling
Markov modeling is a powerful technique for analyzing systems. The basic
concepts of the Markov process model are the system state and the state
transition. The system state fully describes the system status at any given
instant of time. The state transition describes the behavior of the system as
modules fail and are repaired. A system of N modules with each module being
either working or in failure will have
2N states. There are two types of Markov
models: discrete time models and continuous time models. Discrete time models
assume that all state transitions occur at fixed intervals of time. Continuous time
models allow state transitions to occur in a random fashion. In this section the
term Markov model refers to continuous time model.
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One of the most important assumptions in Markov modeling is that the state
transitions depend only on the current state. This means that the time spent in a
given state does not affect the probability of the next transition or the probability
of remaining in the current state. Furthermore, failure rates are constant and do
not depend on the time spent in any state. Thus the model agrees with the
exponential failure law.
As an example, consider a non-redundant system consisting of one module.
If the system has a constant failure rate L (obeys the exponential failure law),
then given that the system was operational at time t, the probability of system
failure at time t+dt is:
1-e-Ldt
Substituting the exponential series expansion for the exponential term above
yields:
= l-[l + (-Ldr)+*=^+...]
And for small values of dt, the above expression reduces to
-e"L'Ldf
Therefore, the probability of system failure within
the time period dt is
approximately L dt Figure 2.4 is
a graphical representation of our simplex
system with failure rate L and repair rate m. The state
probabilistic equations for
the system in figure 2.4 are:
Pi(t + dt) = (1
- Ldt) P^t) + mdt P2(t)
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P2(t + dt) = (1 - mdt) P2(t) + Ldt P^t)
Where, Pj(t) is the probability that the system is at state i at time t, and Pj(t + dt)
is the probability that the system is at state i at time t + dt.
Ldt
1-LdtC 7 1 ) ( 2 1 )1-mdt
mdt
Figure 2.4 Two state differential Markov model
Rearranging the above equations and dividing by dt produce:
[Pi(t + dt) P!(t)]/dt = -LP^t)* mP2(t)
[ P2(t + dt) - P2(t) ] / dt = LP^t) mP2(t)









These equations are known as Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. They can be
written directly from the transition diagram without the self loops. Consider figure
2.5, in which the change in state (1) is the flow coming from state (2) times the
probability of being at state (2), minus the flow out of state (1) times the






Two state Continuous time Markov model








Since the system is assumed to be operational at time t = 0, then P-i(O) = 1, and
P2(0) = 0. Substituting these values in the above equations yields:
(s + LJP^s) m P2(s) = 1
-L P2(s) + (s + m) P2(s) = 0






























Equations 2.6 describe the probabilities of the two system states. P^t) is the
probability that the system is operational at any time t (or known as the system's
Availability). P2(t) is the probability that the system is in a failed state at any time
t. One interesting feature of these equations is that both of them approach a
constant value as t approaches infinity
P-i (infinity) = m /(L+m)
(2.7)
P2(infinity) = L/(L+m)
Pi (infinity) is known as the steady state availability Ass(t). Furthermore, if we are
only interested in the system's steady state status, the state equations can be
rewritten as





Solving these equations with the extra condition (P-, + P2
= 1 ), gives us the same
result as those in equations (2.7).
To calculate the system's reliability, we need to modify the Markov model of
figure 2.5 such that the system's failed state is a trap state (i.e. no repair is













Performing partial fraction expansions and the inverse LaPlace transforms yield:
R(t) = P](t) =
e'u
(f) = P2(f) =
l-e-u
Notice that the above results agree with our original assumption that the system
obeys the exponential failure law.
Modeling a TMR System
Consider a TMR system, where only two of the three processors are
necessary for correct system operation.
The Markov model for such a system
with failure rate L and no repair is shown in figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6 Markov model for TMR system
In the figure above, the states have the following meanings:
state 3 : the three processors are operational.
state 2 : two processors are operational.
state F : the system failed.
Taking LaPlace transforms of the state equations yields:
sP3(s)
- P3(0) = -3LP3(s)
sP2(s) P2(0) = 3LP3(s)
sPF(s) PF(0) = 2LP2(s)
Substituting the initial conditions P3(0)
= 1, P2(0) = 0, and PF(0) = 0, and
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P2(t) = 3e-2Lt . 3e-3Lt
PF(t) = 1 - 3e-2Lt + 2e-3Lt
The reliability of the system is equal to the probability that the system is in either
state (3) or state (2), therefore
RTMR(t) = P3(t) + P2(t)
= e-3Lt + 3e-2Lt - 3e-3Lt
= 3e-2Lt + 2e-3Lt
Now, if we let R(t) = e"Lt, then the above equation becomes:
RTMR(t) = 3R2(t) 2R3(t)
This final result matches the one produced earlier using combinatorial modeling.
2.4 AVAILABILITY MODELING
System availability is an important factor in the analysis of fault-tolerant
systems. In many cases the main concern is not how long a computer can
operate without any failure (reliability), but it is whether it will be available when
needed. As mentioned earlier, availability can be approximated as the system's
operation time divided by the total time elapsed since the system started
operation, or,
AssW = (operation time) / (operation time + repair time) (2.8)
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The above equation emphasizes the importance of short repair times (rate) in
highly available systems.
Markov models can be used to calculate system availability. But since in
many cases we are only interested in the steady state availability Ass(t), another
simpler technique is usually used. Consider a simplex system with failure rate L
and repair rate m, if we assumed that the system experienced N failures during





system operation time = N(MTTF) = N/L,
system repair time = N(MTTR) = N/m








This last result agrees with the formula obtained earlier for Ass(t) using Markov
models (see equation 2.7). As an example, consider the simplex system
modeled in figure 2.5, and let the failure rate L
= 0.01 (MTTF = 100 hr), and the
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repair rate m = 0.1 ( MTTR = 10 hrs). Then from equation (2.9) , the system's
steady state availability is 0.909090909. Using equation (2.6), we get the
availability as:
A(t) = P.,(t) = (0.9090909) + (0.0909090) e-011'




10 20 30 40 50
Figure 2.7 Availability as a function of time
As shown in figure 2.7, the system approaches its steady-state availability value
in a short period of time, hence the importance of this value.
2.5 SAFETY MODELS
The definition of the word
"safe"
itself depends on the application. With this
in mind we will divide each system's failed state into two states, Safe Failed
(SF), and Unsafe Failed (UF). The distinction between these two is whether the
fault was detected by the system or not, hence the importance of fault detection
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coverage C. As an example, consider a simplex system with failure rate L and
fault detection coverage C. The Markov module for this system is shown in
Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8 Markov model for safety calculations.
Taking LaPlace transforms of the state equations with Pi(0) = 1, PSF(0) = PUF(0)
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Finally, the Safety of the system is:
S(t) = P^t) + PSF(t)
= e-"-Ce-"+C
The previous equations agree with the ideas we have built so far. For example,
the system reliability is given by:
R(t) =P1(t) =
e-L
Furthermore, at time t = 0 (initially) the system safety is S(0) = 1 , and as time
approaches infinity the system safety approaches C (the fault coverage). The
next section is a full reliability analysis of a TMR with spare system, 3-out-of-5,
and a 3-out-of-4 majority voting systems.
2.6 SYSTEM COMPARISON
To show the importance of the techniques encountered so far, the reliability
of different fault-tolerant systems will be analyzed. As an example, consider the
following systems: 3-out-of-4 majority voting, 3-out-of-5 majority voting, and TMR
with spare systems (this last one was implemented as part of this thesis work).
3 - out of - 4 System
A 3-out-of-4 majority voting system requires 3
operational processors for its
correct operation. Assume that each processor has a failure rate of L, and no
repair is taking place, then the Markov model is shown
in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9 3-out of-4 Markov model
In figure 2.9, the states have the following meanings:
state 4 : all processors are operational.
state 3 : three processors are operational.
state F : system failed.
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2.6.2 3-out of-5 System
A 3-out-of-5 Majority voting system requires three operational processors at
any time for its correct operation. Assuming that each processor has a failure
rate of L, and no repair is taking place, yield the Markov model of figure 2.10.
3L
M F
Figuie 2.10 3-out-of-j Markov model
Writing the state equations and performing the LaPlace transforms yield
sP5(s)
- P5(0) = -5LPS(S)
sP4(s)
- P4(0) = -4LP4(S) + 5LP5(S)
sP,(s)
- P3(0) = -3LP3(s) + 4LP4(s)
sPF(s)
- PF(0) = 3LP3(s)
Solving for R(t) ( R(t)
= P5(t) + P4(t) + P3(t) ) with the the initial conditions
P5(0) = 1,P4(0) = 0,/>(0)







2.6.3 TMR with Spare System
Using the same assumptions used for the previous systems, gives the
Markov model shown in figure 2.1 1 .
Figure 2.1 1 Markov model for TMR with spare system
In the above figure the states have the following meanings:
state 4 : all three processors and the spare are operational.
state 3 : only three processors are operational
state 2 : only two processors are operational.
state F : the system failed.





Solving for the system's reliability (R(t) = 1
- PF(t)) with the initial conditions,







This value is obviously larger than the reliability values of the previous systems.
Figure 2.12 is a comparison between the systems considered. From figure 2.12
we can notice the following:
- Although both the TMR with spare and the 3-out-of-4 systems contain the same
level of redundancy, the first is more reliable than the second. Furthermore, it is
also more reliable than the 3-out-of-5 system which contains a higher level of
redundancy (4 redundant processors).
- Recall that the reliability graphs of TMR and Simplex systems intersect at a
reliability value of 0.5 (see figure 1.5). The addition of an extra processor to the
TMR may shift this intersection point up (as it is the case with the 3-out-of-4
system), or down (as it is the case with the TMR with spare system). The
up-
shifting means that the redundant system processors must have reliability values
larger than 0.5 to make the redundant system more reliable than the simplex
one. The down shifting loosens this requirement on the redundant system.
- Notice that the reliability of the TMR with spare system becomes smaller than
that of the simplex system after a certain point in time. This suggests that the
TMR with spare system is more suitable for short life applications (In chapter 4
we will come to a different conclusion).
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To further study the characteristics of these systems, the MTTF values were







TMR with spare 108
The above results suggest that although the TMR with spare system has a small
advantage over the simplex system, the Simplex is better than the other
systems. However one should not jump into such inaccurate conclusion. To
explain the above results, take another look at figure 2.12. The MTTF can be
seen as the area under the reliability curve, and that area is larger for the
simplex system than for the 3-out-of-4 and the 3-out-of-5 systems. So, if the
intended application has a short life time the 3-out-of-5 system, for example, is
better than the simplex. This suggests that the MTTF alone is not an accurate
measure of a system. Instead, a measure that takes into consideration the
intended application life is needed, such as the Mission Time MT(r). Table 2.2































TMR with Spare 38.5 hours
Table 2.2 MT(0.90) for different systems with L = 0.01
From table 2.2 one can see that the TMR with spare system has a mission time
improvement factor of 3.66, 1.76, 2.57, and 1.37 over Simplex, TMR, 3-out of-4,
and 3-out-of-5 systems respectively. And all of the TMR, 3-out-of-5, and 3-out-
of-4 systems are superior to the simplex system. Finally notice that all the
previous measures favored the TMR with spare system over the other
considered systems.
2.7 INTERMITTENT FAULTS
In the previous analysis we only considered the effect of hard/permanent
faults on fault-tolerant systems. But since experimental data suggests that
approximately 90% of system faults are intermittent, the effect of this class of
faults must be considered. An intermittent fault can be defined as a fault with
temporary behavior. It may be caused by lose/dry connection(s), temperature
sensitive elements, external interferences, etc. The difficulty with intermittent
faults arises from their temporarily beahviour. Figuer 2.13 is an intermittent fault
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model. The transition rate B (in figure 2.13) has a big effect on the intermittent
faults detection coverage. A full intermittent faults analysis will be done in
chapter 4 (system analysis).
Ok 1 f Failed
A : Intermittent faults rate
B : Intermittent faults disappearing rate.





To study and illustrate some of the design issues involved in fault-tolerant
systems, a fault-tolerant system was built. The system consists of two
reconfigurable Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) with spare modules (see
figure 3.1). The system's application is a two main-substreet-intersections traffic
lights controller (see figure 3.2), with each module controling one intersection.
The system's terminal displays the processors status/failure data and is shared
by both modules. This chapter describes the system's hardware, operation, and
some of the design problems that were encountered and the approach used in
solving them.
3.1 SYSTEM HARDWARE
The system consists of two modules (see figure 3.3 in the appendix).
Each module contains the following elements:
- Three processors (prod, 2, and 3) all of them are Motorola MC68705.
- A spare processor, also MC68705.






















The Processors and the Spares
The processors and the spares are Motorola MC68705. They execute the
application program (i.e. traffic light controlling). Processors 1, 2, and 3 execute
the exact same program. The Spares execute slightly different programs. A
listing of these programs is shown in the appendix.
The processors deliver their outputs (traffic lights control signals) serially.
Delivering the data serially requires each processor to produce another two
control lines for the serial data control (shift registers serial clock and load
signals), a total of three. This approach is better than delivering the outputs in
parallel. The reason is that delivering the data in parallel requires each
processor to produce six output signals (for the six traffic lights at each
intersection). Each of these must pass through a voting stage, a disagreement
detection stage, and a switching circuitry.
One of the major problems in majority voting systems is processor
synchronization. To address this problem, we chose to use a separate clock for
each processor rather than a common clock. This will be the subject of section
3.3.
The Controller
The controller is also a Motorola MC68705. It collects the
processors'
disagreement data (or faults), displays their status and failure data, and
reconfigures the module based on faults information. As seen from figure 3.3,
the controller I/O ports are occupied as follows:
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- Twelve ports d1...d12 (or PA0..PA7, and PB0..PB3 respectively) to collect fault
information (disagreement detection).
- Three lines for module reconfiguration s1, s2, and s3 (or PB5, PB6, PB7).
- Two lines to regulate the collection of processor fault data H2, H3 (or PB4, and
PCO).
- One line for the reset signal (PC1).
- One line to regulate the sharing of the RS232 bus (PC2).
- One line to send data to the terminal (PC3).
Switching Circuitry
The switches (see figure 3.4) are used to determine which processor
participates in the voting process. The controller controls this choice using the
control lines s1, s2, and s3. Each module contains nine switches (a module
contains three processors with three output lines from each, a total of nine). For
example, consider the top switch in figure 3.3, this switch controls the voter input
F1
, to be either PAO from the first processor (if s1 = 0), or PAO from the spare (if
s1 =1).
Voting Circuitry
The voters (see figure 3.5) are 2-out-of-3 majority voters, which means
that the voter output agrees with at least two of its input signals. Each module
contains the following voters (refer to figure 3.3):
- The traffic lights data voter (labeled H1 , the top one in figure 3.3).
- The serial clock voter (labeled H2).
- The load signal voter (labeled H3).
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Disagreement Detection Circuitry
A disagreement detector is simply an XOR that produces a high (1) output
if its inputs are not the same and low (0) otherwise (see Figure 3.6). A
disagreement detector is used to detect whether a processor output agrees with
the voter output (majority output) or not. Each module contains the following
groups of disagreement detectors:
- Data lines disagreement detectors determine whether PAO from each
processor, agrees with the voter output (H1) or not, and produce d1, d2, d3,
andd4.
- Serial clock disagreement detectors determine whether PBO from each
processor agrees with the voter output (H2) or not, and produce d5, d6, d7, and
d8.
- Load signal disagreement detectors determine whether PB1 from each
processor agrees with the voter output H3 or not, and produce d9, d10, d1 1, and
d12.
The disagreement detectors d1, d5, and d9 detect the faults of processor #1.
The disagreement detectors d2, d6, and d10 detect the faults of processor #2.
The disagreement detectors d3, d7, and d11 detect the faults of processor #3.




























Figure 3.6 Disagreement Detectors
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Shift Register
The shift register used is a serial-in parallel-out shift register with buffers,
MC74HC595. The inputs of the shift register are the outputs of the voters H1,
H2, and H3 (for the data, serial clock, and load signals respectively), and its
outputs are connected to the traffic lights (LED's), as shown in figure 3.3.
3.2 SYSTEM OPERATION
As mentioned earlier, the system controls two
main-substreet-
intersections traffic lights (see figure 3.2). The main street green light is five
times longer than the substreet green light. The system contains two modules,
module one (the one to the left in figure 3.2) and module two. Each module
controls one intersection. The modules are almost identical except in that
module two tries to follow module one (so that the two main street traffic lights
are both green), and in that module one is responsible for controlling the RS232
bus.
Each module continues its normal operation if it has at least two
operational processors (including the spare). Otherwise, it goes into flashing by
simply resetting the processors in a specified time interval. This flashing







Each module contains one controller; the controllers are almost identical
except for the differences mentioned earlier. Each controller has its own reset
switch. After receiving a reset signal, the controller from module one sends the
header message to the terminal and the operation continues as follows:
First, each controller resets the processors in its module (at PC1), and initializes
the total number of failures encountered by each processor, so far, to zero. Then
it waits for the serial clock to arrive (H2 at PB4). During each serial clock (H2)
the controller tests the serial clock disagreement lines (d5, d6, d7, and d8) and
saves the results. Then it tests the serial data disagreements lines (d1, d2, d3,
and d4) and saves the results. All this is done before the next serial clock pulse
arrives. Since there are six lights (i.e. six data bits and clock pulses will be
generated), the controller repeats this operation six times, and of course sums
each processor's faults and saves the results. Then the controller waits for the
load signal (H3) to arrive. When it arrives the controller tests the parallel load
disagreement lines (d9, d10, d1 1, and d12) , and saves the results.
While the processors are waiting for the current traffic light time slot to elapse,
the controller starts analyzing the collected data, and tests whether any of the
processors encountered a permanent fault or exceeded the maximum number of
intermittent faults allowed. Depending on these results the controller may decide
to reconfigure the module, go to flashing, or continue its normal operation. The
decision is made as follows:
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- If a processor, P,, encounters a permanent fault at any of its output lines, then
Pi is a faulty processor and the system is reconfigured (i.e. the spare processor
is considered in the voting process instead of Pf).
- If a non-faulty processor Pj encounters N intermittent faults then,
if N > maximum limit
,
then Pj is faulty and the system is reconfigured.
if N <= maximum limit, then the system continues its normal operation.
- If two processors fail then, the Module fails:
if this is the first module failure, flash traffic lights four times and restart
the module (This is done to make the system more available).
if this is the second module failure, then go to flashing indefinitely until
Module is reset by the supervisor.
- After every M (time units) clear all operational
processors'
fault records, and
start counting from zero.
The controller considers any two or more consecutive faults on any line to be
permanent, and intermittent otherwise. The maximum number of intermittent
faults allowed (N faults in M time units) is set depending on: the
expected/measured intermittent faults rate, whether the faults are casued by
global conditions or not, and on the system application.
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The Processors
The processors, in each module, execute the same program with the
spare program being slightly different in the synchronization procedure. After
receiving the reset signal from the controller, a processor sends an ail-off signal
to the traffic lights for half a second, then it sends a green signal for the main
street lights and red for the substreet lights, and continues from there in a
weighted round robin manner. Module one processors send their status to
module two processors, so that the later will try to follow the operation of the
first.
As mentioned earlier, one of the major problems that faces majority voting
systems is to synchronize the processors for the voting process to be a success.
The following section considers this problem and our approach in detail.
3.3 SYNCHRONIZATION
Synchronizing voting processors and keeping them synchronized is one
of the problems that faces all majority voting systems. In our system we used a
separate clock for each processor to address this problem. One of the major
causes of this problem is that even without any processor failures, and even if
the processors started operation at the same clock cycle, these processors will
eventually go out of synchronization due to the fact
that even the best quartz
crystals have a margin of error of 0.01%
- 0.5 %. Of course the error may be
very small in a well designed system operating in a
controlled environment, but
still it is there and it will affect the system operation. Furthermore, since it is very
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necessary in many applications to use timers, a one per million clock error, for
example, will be magnified by the timer prescalar factor, resulting in an N per
million clock error; a more serious situation.
Of course the clock sources errors are not the only cause of the synchronization
problem; faults usually drive processors out of synchronization. One may not
have a great concern about a processor being driven out of synchronization by a
permanent fault since the processor is faulty anyway, but this argument does not
hold when we are dealing with intermittent faults, especially with most studies
suggesting that up to 90% of system failures are due to intermittent faults. With
this being the case, system designers need to make sure that intermittent faults
do not drive processors out of synchronization, hence having the effect of
permanent faults.
In our system the synchronization problem effect was very clear. The
system was first built using a common clock source and it was working almost
fault free. But when we tried to use separate clock sources, the voting process
was rarely a success and (on the average) the system's MTTF was 2 seconds.
Studying the behavior of the system showed that even if the processors started
at the same clock cycle (after the reset), they will be hundreds of clock cycles
out of synchronization four to five seconds later. Our search for the cause of the
problem led us to the timer prescaling factor (a factor of 128) which magnifies
the crystal errors 128 times. After setting this factor to one, the system's MTTF
improved to a system failure every 20 to 30 seconds. These failures were mainly
caused by crystal errors driving the processors out of synchronization. The
crystal errors were caused by stray capacitances and noises on the circuit
board. After isolating the crystals from the system common ground, the system's
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MTTF improved to a system failure every five to seven minutes. Finally,
synchronizing the processors produced an almost failure free system.
Our Approach
Although we had a plenty of system time that can be spent on processor
synchronization (due to the application), we tried to synchronize the processors
as efficiently as possible. Figure 3.7 shows the extra hardware connections that
has to be made between the processors to synchronize them. These




synchronization message to other processors, and to receive such messages
from them. Notice also that these connections are arranged in a way that will
allow each processor to treat ports C and B connections as
"
me first, then the
others in ascending order". This arrangement allows the processors to execute
the same program and enables them to physically replace each other.
Figure 3.8 is a flowchart of the synchronization procedure
"synchronize"
which is
executed by the processors one, two, and three. Figure 3.9 is a flowchart of the
same procedure executed by the spare processor.
Finally, to prevent the processors from being driven out of synchronization, the
synchronization procedure is executed every one second and also before any
voting process. This may seem to be too costly, but the time spent on the




































Figure 3.7 The extra connections needed
to synchronize the processors
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3.4 THE SYSTEM
The system is mounted on a single board, except for the reset circuitry
and the crystals, which are mounted on separate boards. The voters, switches,
buffers, and the disagreement detectors were implemented using programmable
logic arrays. Figure 3.10 (in the appendix) shows the actual pin connections for
each of the system's modules. It is easy to understand the analogy between
figure 3.10 and figure 3.3 since we used the same labeling in both figures.
In the following paragraph, a circuit is labeled after its output. For
example, a switch with an output line labeled F1 will be called switch F1. U1
through U6 in each module are PALCE16V8 programmable logic arrays:
- U1 : Implements the first five switches (F1,....,F5).
- U2 : Implements the switches (F6 F9).
- U3 : Implements the three voters (H1, H2, and H3).
- U4 : Implements the data disagreement detectors (d1 d4).
- U5 : Implements the serial clocks disagreement detectors (d5 d9).
- U6 : Implements the load signals disagreement detectors (d10,...,d12), and
the three buffers between the controller (PC1), and the processors reset
circuits.
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The system is mounted on a single board, except for the reset circuitry
and the crystals, which are mounted on separate boards. The voters, switches,
buffers, and the disagreement detectors were implemented using programmable
logic arrays. Figure 3.10 shows the actual pin connections for each of the
system's modules. It is easy to understand the analogy between figure 3.10 and
figure 3.3 since we used the same labeling in both figures.
In the following paragraph, a circuit is labeled after its output. For
example, a switch with an output line labeled F1 will be called switch F1. U1
through U6 in each module are PALCE16V8 programmable logic arrays:
- U1 : Implements the first five switches (F1 F5).
- U2 : Implements the switches (F6, F9).
- U3 : Implements the three voters (H1, H2, and H3).
- U4 : Implements the data disagreement detectors (d1 d4).
- U5 : Implements the serial clocks disagreement detectors (d5,...,d9).
- U6 : Implements the load signals disagreement detectors (d10 d12), and
the three buffers between the controller (PC1), and the processors reset
circuits.






As mentioned earlier, statistics show that up to 90% of system failures are
caused by intermittent faults. With this being the case, the reliability analysis of
fault-tolerant systems will not be accurate without taking this class of faults into
consideration. In this chapter we discuss the reliability of our system while
concentrating on intermittent faults and their effects.
4.2 SYSTEM MODELING
A processor in our system is considered to be faulty if it encounters a
permanent fault or more than N intermittent faults in M hours. Permanent faults
are defined as those existing during two or more consecutive decisions, while
Intermittent faults do not. The values of the parameters N and M should be set
depending on: the intermittent fault rate, intermittent fault causes, and the
system application.
The Markov model of our system is shown in figure 4.1, with the
intermittent faults being modeled for one processor only due to graph
complexity. The intermittent fault models for the other processors are the same
as the one shown. In figure 4.1, states Q1, Q2, and Q3 represent the system
with four, three, or two working processors, respectively. And state x ( x
= 1....N)
represents a processor with x intermittent faults.
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Figure 4.1 System Modeling
i: Intermittent Faults rate
p: Permanent Faults rate
The state equations for the above model are very difficult to solve, and
they will become much more difficult if we consider the state equations for all
the remaining processors. Hence, let us try to find an equivalent simpler model
for the one in figure 4.1. First, consider the models in figures 4.2 and 4.3. State
Q1 in figure 4.3 is the same as that in figure 4.2, and state (1) in figure 4.3
represents the combination of states (1) through (N) in figure 4.2. Our goal now
is to find A (in figure 4.3) such that these two models are equivalent.
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Figure 4.2
Markov model for a processor with intermittent faults only
Figure 4.3
Equivalent module of figure 4.2
Consider the model in figure 4.2. The equation for state Q1 is given by:
*p =
a(o+^w+^w+ +pa*)







In equation (4.1), Pj represents the state i (i
= 1....N). The equation for state Q1











Now, we want to find the value of A in equation (4.2) such that equations (4.1)
and (4.2) are equivalent. To do so, we write every Pj(s) in equation (4.1) in terms
of P-|(s), and then equate the two equations and solve for A. Solving with the








W = \ Px(s)
s+ +/
M
and for state 3:
sP3(s)








Substituting for P2(s) (from equation 4.3) in the previous equation,
we get:









s + + i
M
Substituting the values for P^s), P2(s) PN(s) in equation (4.1) yields:
sQi(s)
-







k = 0 M
Hence, the value of A in equation (4.2) is:




Taking the inverse LaPlace transforms yields:
i i k=N-l ;k.(k-l)
A(t) = + -Y
lt
e""
M M i (k-l)\ (4.8)
where, a = i + p + 1/M .
Finally, combining the intermittent fault models for all processors, gives us the




Equivalent model of figure 4. 1
In figure 4.4, A is given by equation (4.8). B and C were obtained following the
same analysis used for A, and they are given by:












where, a = i + p + 1/M .
This concludes the modeling of our system.
Recall that in section 2.6 the reliability of our system was calculated under




Assume that the system encounters intermittent faults only (p = 0); then
the transitions V to W, V to X, W to X, and Y to X in figure 4.4 will disappear.
Furthermore, the transition rate C(t) will be equal to zero, A(t) will stay the same,







where, a = i + 1/M in both A(t) and B(t).
Before writing the state equations and solving for the system's reliability, there is
one last issue that has to be dealt with. In the model of figure 4.4 the state
transitions are not constants. This means that our system does not obey the
exponential failure law. The most straightforward solution to this problem is to
approximate these state transitions using constant values, but can we? To
answer this question, let us try to interpret the meaning of these state transitions.
A(t) represents the intermittent fault disappearance rate, or (as described in
chapter 2) the transition from the failed state to the pseudo-failed state (see
figure 2.13). A(t) can be thought of as being the "repair
rate."
B(t) represents the
processors failure rate due to intermittent faults only. Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and
4.8, are plots of A(t) and B(t) for different values of M and N.
Figure 4.5: shows the effect of the parameter M on B(t). As expected, the
probability that a processor will encounter more than N faults in M time units is
bigger for larger values of M (longer time intervals).
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Figure 4.6 : shows the effect of the parameter N on B(t). One can see how
changing N changes the peak value for B(t) and its location. A larger value of N
means that a processor can tolerate more intermittent faults, hence B(t) has a
smaller peak value. The location of this peak is at:
t = t- hours (4.11)
i +
M
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the effect of both M and N on A(t). Notice that A(t)
peaks at the same location regardless of M and N values. The steady state
value of A(t) is 1/M. Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between the speed at
which A(t) reaches its steady state and the value of the parameter N.
To approximate these functions (A(t) and B(t)) by constants, keep in mind that in
reliability analysis the safest and the most reliable approach is the one based on
the worst condition assumptions. So, in our system we will assume that the
failure rate
, B(t), is constant at its maximum value, and the "repair
rate,"
A(t), is
constant at its minimum value. This will give us a model similar to those of
chapter 2.
The state equations for the model of figure 4.4 are given below:
(s +4i)V(s)-4AY(s) = 1 (4.12)
(s + 4A + 4B)Y(s) - 4iV(s) = 0 (4.13)
(s + 3i)W(s)
- 4BY{s)
- 3AZ(s) = 0 (4.14)
(s + 3A + 3B)Z(s)
- 3iW(s) = 0 (4.15)
(s + 2i) X (s) - 3BZ(s) = 0 (4-16)
sF(s)
-
















o in o in
"
o in
CO cu cu ?i -wi o





























o CO CO "V cu o









































From equations (4.12) and (4.13) we get:
(S + 4A + 4B)
0 + 4i)U + 4A +4)-16iA
^4"18^
4/
Y(s) = C4 iq)
(s + 4i)(s + 4A + 4B)-\6iA
[ '
From equation (4.15) we get:
(S + 3A + 3B) ^r x
3/
(,S) (4-20)
And from equation (4.16) we get:
-4BY(s) + (s + 3i)W(s) - 3AZ(s) = 0 (4.21)
Substituting for Y(s) and W(s) in the above equation yields:
-4B( ) + (s +
3i)(S+ 3A +
3B)Z(s) - 3AZ(s) = 0
(s + 4i)(s + 4A + 4B)-l6iA 3/
Or,
Z(s) =[ ^ ][ ^ ] (4.22)
(s + 4i)(s + 4A + 4B)-16iA (s + 3i){s + 3A + 3B) -9iA





s + 2i (s + 4i)(s + 4A + 4B)-l6iA (s + 3i)(s + 3A + 3B) -9iA
Substituting the value for X(s) above in equation 4.17 and rearranging give:
F() =r2iirJB_ir
16iB 3/




F(s) = t22LJL (4.24)





+ 2AB + 2iA - 2/B
C2 = 2(/\+e+/) + 27>42+
B*
+ 2AB + 2iA - 2/B









Notice that C3 = C, , and C4 = C2
Hence,




s(s + 2i)(s + Cl)(s+C2)(s + -Cl)(s + -C2)
Because we are only interested in the reliability of the system,
we only need to
solve equation (4.25). First, taking the partial fraction expansions yields:
F{s) =
*L +J^ +_^_ +_^ +_^ +
s_ (4.26)


































Taking the inverse LaPlace transforms yields:
3 3











And finally, the system reliability is given by:
R(t) = l-F(t) (4-28)
Now, consider a 3-out-of-5 majority voting system. This system
involves
the same level of hardware redundancy as our system (4 redundant
processors).
Assume that this system encounters intermittent faults only at a rate
i
failure/hour. Furthermore, assume that the intermittent faults have a
maximum
duration of one system decision (this was the definition of
intermittent faults in
our system). With these assumptions being made, the 3-out-of-5 system
will fail
only if it encounters three
intermittent faults at the same time. To clarify, assume
that from the fault-free state a processor (in the
3-out-of-5 system) encountered
an intermittent fault putting the system in
the four-working/one-faulty state. Then
if during the next system decision
another processor encountered
another
intermittent fault, this will also put the system
in the four-operational/one-faulty
state. This behavior is due to the assumption we made,
which implies that the
first faulty processor is now
operational caused by the intermittent fault
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disappearance. Considering this, the system can be modeled with two states
only: the all operational state and the system failed state. The transition from the
first state to the second is /3. Finally, the reliability of the 3-out-of-5 system is
given by:
R(t)=e-i3t
Figure 4.9 shows a comparison between our system, a simplex system,
and a 3-out-of-5 system, with i = 0.5 intermittent faults/hour and without any
repair. Although the assumptions we made favor the 3-out-of-5 system, our
system is still more reliable than the other systems.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the effect of the values M and N on the
reliability of our system. As expected, decreasing M (or increasing 1/M, the
"repair rate") improves the reliability of our system, and increasing N (the
intermittent fault tolerance capability) also improves the system's reliability. In
practice these values should be set depending on different factors, such as:
- The intermittent fault rate.
- The intermittent to permanent fault ratio.
- The percentage of intermittent faults that are caused by common factors (to all
processors) to the total number of intermittent
faults.



































































The techniques and design issues involved in fault tolerant systems were
discussed. Evaluation criteria were presented with some emphasis on reliability
analysis.
The reliability of hardware fault-tolerant systems is usually done under
permanent fault conditions. The effects of intermittent faults on system reliability
are not fully considered. With statistical data suggesting that up to 90% of
system failures may be caused by intermittent faults, reliability analysis
techniques must concentrate more on this class of faults.
To realize the techniques and the design issues discussed, a
reconfigurable Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) with spare system was built.
The general problem of synchronization in majority voting systems, causes and
solutions, was presented and discussed. A design and reliability analysis
approaches were introduced & implemented. The TMR with spare system was
designed to tolerate a higher level of intermittent faults. This level is controlled
by the parameters M & N which should be set based on the intermittent faults
rate and their causes. A system with intermittent faults caused by global
conditions affecting all its modules should use lower values of the parameter N.
This is because the intermittent faults in this system will have a higher
overlapping probability which may cause an undetectable system errors. The
effect of these parameters on the system's reliability is shown in figures 4.10 &
4.1 1. Although these parameters reflect the level of confidence in the processors
(i.e. a processor is considered fault free despite its encountering N intermittent
faults in M hours), the parameter M (for example) can be thought of as the
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processors repair rate which explains the reliability value of one when N = 1/M in
figure 4.11.
Reliability analysis of the system under permanent fault conditions
showed a higher system reliability compared to other systems especially for
short time applications (see figure 2.12). Reliability analysis under intermittent
fault conditions showed a very big improvement over other redundant (3-out-of-
5) and non-redundant (simplex) systems without any restriction by the intended
application life (see figure 4.9 and compare it to figure 2.12). Furthermore, keep
in mind that these results were obtained despite the worst case assumptions for
our system and a favorable assumptions for the 3-out-of-5 system which
emphasizes the importance of these results.
Although this work did not contain any actual fault statistics, the design
and reliability approaches presented in this work are expected to be useful and,
hopefully, more accurate than the traditional techniques once the values of the
parameters. M & N are carefully set. Determining the optimal values of these
parameters can be the subject of some further work in this area, which may also
involve the use of techniques presented in modeling non-overlapping permanent
faults in fault-tolerant systems.
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By : Khalid Al-kofahi
Date : May 25, 1993
Descrption :
This program is executed by the controller ofmodule 1. It tests all three processors and
the spare for intermittent and permanent faults, and reconfigure the module according
ly. It also controlls the RS232 to the terminal and displays the headder messages and
the
processors'
fault data. The operation proceeds as follows :
- First display headdermessage and reset all processors ( procedures messl & first).
- Wait for the serial clock, when recieved : test the serial data and the serial clock
disagreement detectors ( dl .. d8 ). Repeat six times ( for the six clock cycles) and store
the results in dl_p,d2_p,d3_p,d4_p,cl_p,c2_p,c3_p,c4_p respectively.
- Wait for the laod signal, when recieved : test the load signals disagreement detectors
( d9...dl2) and store the resutl in 11,12,13,14 respectively.
- Note :
di_p : # of faults encountered during the last decision on processor i data line.
ci_p : # of faults encountered during the last decision on processor i clock line.
li_p : # of faults encountered during the last decisionon processor i load line.
di : total # of faults on processor i data line.
ci : total # of faults on processor i clock line.
li : total # of faults on processor i load line.
( processor # 4 is the spare).
- Check all the di's, ci's and li's registers and reconfigure if needed.
- Upon module failure, flash the module four times and start all over ( if this is the first




























start at location $100 after reset
*
refer to figure 3.3 for actual connections
*
























































cont : contains N.
*
conti : a flag register to test for permanent faults on processor i
* load lines, if it is == 2, then processor i has permanent fault on
* its load line. It is cleared every two cycles.
*
contains the number of faulty processors
*




maximum number of intermittent faults allowed (M)
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clr port_a
clr port_b *select original processors ( proc
clr port_c
clr again
bset 3,port_c * tx = high
*******************************************************




bset 2,port_c * release RS232
jsr first * reset all processors
loopl jsr secnd
ldx #6
wait brclr 4,port_b,wait * wait for the serial clock
jsr delay
jsr testl * test dl...d8 lines
decx
bne wait * repeat six times
wait2 brclr 0,port_c,wait2 * wait for load signal
jsr delay
jsr test2 *testd9..dl2
jsr procl * test processor 1 lines
jsr proc2 * test processor 2 lines
jsr proc3 * test processor 3 lines
jsr proc4 * test spare processore lines
clr cont5
*









inc cont5 * processor 2 is faulty
























































* is it the first failure
*
this the second failure, goto flash and stay there
*






* flash 4 times then restart
*
reset processors







If here then module already failed
flash jsr delay 1
* 0.1305 sec
jsr delay 1















































testd5.. d8 &dl..d4 *********************************************
testl brclr 4,port_a,t2 *d5
inc cl_p
t2 brclr 5,port_a,t3 *d6
inc c2_p
t3 brclr 6,port_a,t4 *d7
inc c3_p
t4 brclr 7,port_a,t5 *d8
inc c4_p
t5 brclr 0,port_a,t6 *dl
inc dl_p
t6 brclr l,port_a,t7 *d2
inc d2_p
t7 brclr 2,port_a,t8 *d3
inc d3_p






test d9 dl2 ***********************************************************
test2 brclr 0,port_b,al *d9
inc ll_p
al brclr l,port_b,a2 *dl0
inc 12_p
a2 brclr 2,port_b,a3 *dll
inc 13_p



























tempi = $10 : address of dl
*
temp2 = $13 : address of d2
*
returns wether the processor is faulty or not ( bit 0 of register res)
* if not cleared, the processor is faulty
*
a flag for the main to indicate processor 1 is faulty
*
contl is clered every two consecutive cycles, if it is = 2, then
*
the load line of this processor has a permanent fault
***************************************************************************







































































tests jjje regiS(ers between the adresses tempi & temp2 . these registers contain the
t*ti-
nrofpccrtrQ th i i 1tc inform5ttirYn
^^^^^?^^^^^?^^^^?^^^^^^^t^^^tvjf^tt-f*!1
*
contains the address of di , i = 1,2,3,4
*
two consecutive faults = permanent
*
processor is faulty due to permanent faults
*
processor's intermittent faults > N ?
*
processor is fualty due to intermittent faults



























































jsr displ * show
processors'
status








status, statrting at $10 (or dl) and ending at $lb (or 14)
**********
















disp2 * fault information at location $10+x
*




* did I reach 14 or not yet ?
* is processor loperational ?
*
no it is not, display N in its column on the screen.
*
yes it is , then disply Y in its column on the screen.
* is processor 2 operational ?




































^^ procedure sends the data in register tx to the screen, one start bit , two stop bits.
* is the spare considered in the voting process ?
*
yes it is, then display Y in its column on the screen.
*
no it is not, display N in its column on the screen.
*

































send a start bit




















































































space Ida #spc * print k spaces, k = contents of reg. x
































delay 1 bclr 7,t_cntl








mesl FCC / PI P2 P3 Spare /
FCB $0D,$0A
FCC /ABCDEFGHIJKL/ * see figure 3.3 for meaning
FCC / PI P2 P3 Spare Module/
FCB $24
yes FCC / Y/
FCB $24
no FCC / N/
FCB $24
mes5 FCC / FATAL ERROR ====>Module - 1 - FLASHING <=====/
FCB $24





**** Program : cont2.asm
**** BY : Khahd All-kofahi
**** Date : May 25, 1993
**** Description:




the only difference is that this controller does not write the header messages,
****
















































































data to printed as ascii
































































































































































































































































































































send a start bit

























































































































mesl FCC / PI P2 P3 Spare /
FCB $0D,$0A
FCC /ABCDEFGHIJKL/
FCC / PI P2 P3 Spare/
FCB $24
yes FCC / Y/
FCB $24
no FCC / N/
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FCB $24
mes5 FCC / FATAL ERROR =====> Module -2- FLASHING <=
FCB $24





By : Khalid Al-kofahi
Date : May 25,1993
Description :
This program is executed by processor 1, 2, & 3. The program proceeds in the following
manner:
- After reset, send all of signal to the traffic lights.
Traffic lights start at Nr-Eg, and continues looping in a weighted time slices fashion.
- Before each voting process ( changing the traffic lights ), all processors are
synchronized ( call procedure synch).
While wating for the current time slice to elapse, synchronize the processors every 0.5
seconds.
Refer to figure 3.7 and 3.8 for further information about this program.
The lines being voted upon are :
- PAO - serial data out : 6 - bits
- PBO ~ serial clock.






























count 1 equ $14
*
start here after reset
* timer interrupt service routine
* North red - East green
* North red - East yellow
* North red - East red
* North green - East red

















































synchronize with other processors
*




the length of time slice = 2 * del_sn
*























bra main * continue looping
**************************************************************************
***



































pore at PCI is out
*
proc at PC2 is out
*
send I am ready signal
* PC- 3,2,1,0 =1111
*
a processor(s) is not ready, time out is reached.
*





















the processor at PC2 is too late, don't wait any longer
if all others ( except the one at PCI) are ready, then done
* PC- 3,2,1,0 =11X1
if all others (except the one at PC2) are ready, then done
PC- 3,2,1,0 =1X11
* in case others did not read me yet
*
clear I am ready signal
****************************************************************************
***





















serial clock ofwidth 200 cycle
* 100 cycle
*
send data ( six times)
*
parallel clock of width 400 cycle at PB 1
****************************************************************************
***
procedure flash : if I am faulty or more than two faulty processors
then flash all the time
109
****************************************************************************








bra flash * stay here
****************************************************************************
delay Ida #100



































which one is late ?
Ida port_b
and #$lc


















By : Khalid Al-kofahi
**** Date : May 25, 1993
**** Description :
**** This program is executed by the spare processors in both modules. It is the same as the
****
program processor.asm ( executed by processors 1, 2, & 3) except in the procedure
****
















































































































































proc 3 is faulty
* I am ready.
*
PCO, PCI, PC2,PC3 = 1111
*
processor 1 is too late (time out)
*
processor 2 is too late ( time out)
*
processor 3 is too late ( time out)
* I am ready
* PC- 3,2,1,0 =11X1
* I am ready















* I am ready
* PC- 3,2,1,0 =X111






















serial clock of width 100 cycle
send data
*












* delayl = 512800 cycles
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8-BIT EPROM MICROCOMPUTER UNIT
The MC68705P3 Microcomputer Unit (MCUI is an EPROM member
of the M6805 Family of low-cost single-chip microcomputers. The user
programmable EPROM allows program changes and lower volume
applications in comparison to the factory mask programmable versions.
The EPROM versions also reduce the development costs and turn
around time for prototype evaluation of the mask ROM versions. This
8-bit microcomputer contains a CPU. on-chip CLOCK. EPROM.
bootstrap ROM, RAM. I/O, and a TIMER.
Because of these features, the MC68705P3 offers the user an
economical means of designing an M6805 Family MCU into his system,




112 bytes of RAM
Memory Mapped I/O
1804 Bytes of User EPROM
Internal 8-Bit Timer with 7-Bit Prescaler
Programmable Prescaler
Programmable Timer Input Modes
External Timer Interrupt
Vectored Interrupts External, Timer, and Software
Zero-Cross Detection on TnT Input
20 TTL/CMOS Compatible Bidirectional I/O Lines (8 Lines are
LED Compatible!
On-Chip Generator
Master and Power-On Reset
Complete Deyelopment System Support on EXORciser
Emulates the MC6805P2 and MC6805P4 (Except for Vsb>
Bootstrap Program in ROM Simplifies EPROM Programming
SOFTWARE FEATURES:
Similar to M6800 Family
Byte Efficient Instruction Set
Easy to Program
True Bit Manipulation
Bit Test and Branch Instructions
Versatile Interrupt Handling
Versatile Index Register
Powerful Indexed Addressing for Tables
Full Set of Conditional Branches
Memory Usable as Registers/Flags
Single Instruction Memory Examine/Change
10 Powerful Addressing Modes
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